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Abstract 
One of the most influential traditional objections to Adverbialism about perceptual experience is 
that posed by Frank Jackson’s ‘many property problem’. Perhaps largely because of this 
objection, few philosophers now defend Adverbialism. We argue, however, that the essence of the 
many property problem arises for all of the leading metaphysical theories of experience: all 
leading theories must simply take for granted certain facts about experience, and no theory looks 
well positioned to explain the facts in a straightforward way. Because of this, the many property 
problem isn’t on its own a good reason for rejecting Adverbialism; and nor is it a puzzle that will 
decide amongst the other leading theories. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the Adverbialist theory of perception, perceptual experience isn’t a relation. 
Traditionally, the view was advanced as a thesis about how to analyze the language of perceptual 
reports. On the face of it, ‘Frank is perceptually experiencing a red object’ seems to ascribe a 
relation between Frank and some red object. But in the light of familiar concerns raised by 
experientially indistinguishable illusions and hallucinations, the object to which Frank is related 
must not be an ordinary object. Rather, it must be a red sense-datum, a Meinongian object, or 
something else that could be present in ‘bad cases’ (hallucination, illusion) as well as ‘good cases’ 
(genuine perception). Adverbialists aim to avoid commitment to such things while providing a 
uniform account of experiences, and so they deny that the ascription reports a real relation. ‘Frank 
is perceptually experiencing a red object’ should then be ‘analyzed’ or understood as equivalent to 
‘Frank is perceptually experiencing redly’. The latter sentence describes Frank’s experience in 
terms of a way of experiencing rather than in terms of an experiential relation to an object.  
 These days, Adverbialism is usually treated as being of purely historical significance. One 
reason for this is the view that Frank Jackson’s ‘many property problem’ poses an unanswerable 
objection to the theory. We argue here that the essence of this problem applies to all theories of 
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perceptual experience, and so is not a problem specifically for Adverbialism. Our aim in pointing 
this out is not to defend Adverbialism, but rather to draw attention to a general problem for all 
theories of experience. 
2. Adverbialism 
Although it was formulated (by Chisholm 1957 and others) as a linguistic thesis,  Adverbialism is 
perhaps best understood as a metaphysical thesis about perceptual experience: experiences are 
non-relational modifications of the mind (see Kriegel 2011).  If they are right, Adverbialists are 1
well positioned to give a uniform account of veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences 
without appealing to non-ordinary objects. 
 Frank Jackson (1977) raised a powerful objection to Adverbialism, which has become 
known as the ‘many property problem’. Jackson argued that Adverbialists face a dilemma: either 
they fail to distinguish clearly distinct experiences, or they fail to respect obvious entailments. 
Consider the following:  
(1) Frank is experiencing a red square and a green circle. 
(2) Frank is experiencing a red circle and a green square.  
On the face of it, Adverbialists must say that the conditions under which (1) is true are the same 
as the conditions under which (2) is true. In linguistic terms, both are regimented as ‘Frank is 
experiencing red-ly and square-ly and green-ly and circle-ly’. Since conjunction is commutative, 
the charge is that Adverbialists fail to distinguish these two cases. 
 One solution is to ‘fuse’ the properties that cluster together (the colours and shapes in this 
case) so that the needed distinction between (1) and (2) can be drawn. So, in the case just 
described, the Adverbialist might appeal to the fused properties of experiencing red-square-ly and 
experiencing red-circle-ly respectively. But as Jackson points out, we now find ourselves hooked 
on the other horn of the dilemma. From the fact that one is experiencing a red square, it follows 
that one is experiencing red; and from the fact that one is experiencing a green circle, it follows 
that one is experiencing green. But these entailments fail on the fusion view. Because the ‘fused’ 
 Additional discussions of Adverbialism can be found in Ducasse (1940), Hare (1969), Kriegel 1
(2007, 2008) Mendelovici (2018), Papineau (2014), and Sellars (1969).
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adverbs are syntactically simple (which is supposed to reflect the existence of wholly distinct 
properties or distinct ways a mind can be modified), there seems to be no way to recover the 
property of experiencing-red-ly from the property of experiencing red-square-ly. So, the 
Adverbialist either fails to differentiate distinct experiences, or fails to capture obvious 
entailments about experience. 
 The Adverbialist can respond as follows. When faced with (1) and (2), Adverbialists 
should ‘fuse’ the properties, but when faced with the obvious entailments, they should say it is 
simply a metaphysical fact that experiencing red-round-ly entails experiencing red-ly. This fact 
does not admit of a further explanation: it is simply a brute fact about the way perceptual 
experience works. Although this is perhaps the best response for the Adverbialist, it is hard not 
see it as an unsatisfyingly ad hoc stipulation. This is a powerful reason to reject Adverbialism. 
And for many philosophers (though not Jackson 1977), intentionalism about experience presents 
itself as an attractive alternative.  2
2. Intentionalism 
According to Intentionalism, perceptual experiences are intentional or representational states. On 
the usual versions of this view (Byrne 2001, Tye 1995), Frank’s experiencing something red 
consists in Frank standing in a relation to a propositional content. Frank is visually representing 
(e.g.) that there is something red and is therefore related to the content that something is red. 
 Contents themselves stand in entailment relations and it may seem that this fact makes 
Intentionalism invulnerable to the many-property problem. First, with respect to the difference 
between (1) and (2), Intentionalists offer the following: 
 (1)   Frank is experiencing a red square and a green circle.  
 (1´)  Frank is visually representing that there is something red and square and something green 
  and circular.  
 (2)  Frank is experiencing a red circle and a green square.  
 For further responses see D’Ambrosio (forthcoming), Kriegel (2011), and Tye (1989). For 2
further complications see Dinges (2015), Grzankowski (2018), and Woodling (2016).
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 (2´) Frank is visually representing that there is something red and      
  circular and something green and square. 
This approach treats the contents of experience as ‘general’ contents; the usual approach employs 
distinct bound variables that will ‘hold’ the properties together in the right ways to distinguish (1) 
and (2). (It is also possible to treat the contents of experience as singular; nothing we say below 
turns on this decision.) 
 Intentionalists also seem to have a simple way to explain the entailment from 
experiencing something red and round to experiencing something red. On the face of it, the fact 
that the content that there is something red and round entails the content that there is something 
red provides our explanation.  
 But despite the obvious appeal of this move, things cannot be this simple. To see why, 
consider the relation an experiencer bears to a content according to Intentionalists, variously 
labelled in the literature – Alex Byrne (2009) calls it the relation of ‘ex-ing’ and Adam Pautz 
(2010) calls it ‘sensorily entertaining’. Now suppose that it is entailments among contents that 
explain the relationships between experiences. The problem is that there are many other 
entailments that contents themselves have, which have no bearing on the relevant experiences at 
all. For example, the content that there is something red entails that there is something red and 
2+2=4. But it makes little sense to suppose that this entailment could be reflected in someone’s 
perceptual experience. 
 Intentionalists now face a dilemma. In order to avail themselves of the relations among 
contents to capture the obvious relations between experiences, they must appeal to entailment. 
But in order to block irrelevant entailments, they must deny that sensorily entertaining is closed 
under entailment. But if sensorily entertaining is not closed under entailment, how can 
Intentionalists use the usual notion of entailment as an independent explanation of the relations 
between experiences? 
 It is a familiar fact that not all intentional relations are closed under entailment. In other 
words, just because the content of one’s representational state entails some other content, it does 
not follow that one is thereby in a representational state with the entailed content. Consider some 
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examples. The proposition that Henry and Craig join the party entails that Henry joins the party. 
But I might hope that Henry and Craig join the party even though I do not hope that Henry alone 
joins the party. I might like their joint company but prefer them not to come to the party at all if 
they aren’t coming together. Or here is another: the content that the ball is on the table entails the 
content that something is on the table. But someone who consciously judges that the ball is on the 
table needn’t thereby judge that there is something on the table. In light of the first judgement it 
would be rational to make the second judgement (and so perhaps one should have it), but they 
needn’t make it. They might be too lazy, too tired, pressed for time; or they might simply lack the 
ability to make a judgement with a quantified content. 
 An Intentionalist can nonetheless insist that the relationships between experiencing 
something red and round and experiencing something red, for example, are explained by specific 
entailments between the specific experiential contents of the relevant perceptual states. But now 
they seem to be very much in the company of the Adverbialist who insists that there are brute 
metaphysical relations holding amongst non-relational experiences. Granted, the Intentionalist 
won’t need to posit a new metaphysically brute fact for each and every desired connection 
between states — their basic resource is just the familiar relation of entailment. But we still need 
an explanation of why we can appeal to entailment to explain some connections between 
experiences, while denying that entailment relations between contents are reflected in all such 
connections.  
 In other words, Intentionalists and Adverbialists both need an explanation of what we 
might call the ‘laws of appearance’: why some contents must hang together and others do not.  3
But this was the heart of the original many properties problem: why is it that someone who 
experiences something red and round must also experience something red? If this is a problem, it 
seems to be a problem for Intentionalism just as it was for Adverbialism. We charged the 
Adverbialist with appealing to an unsatisfyingly ad hoc stipulation; now a similar charge can be 
laid against the Intentionalist.  
 The term ‘laws of appearance’ is due to McGinn (1983). The problem has also been recently 3
discussed by Pautz (unpublished, 2017) who also appreciates that the problem is faced by many 
theorists.
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3. Naive Realism and Sense-Data 
On the face of it, relational (or ‘act-object’) theories may seem immune to this problem, since the 
facts about experienced properties are explained in terms of facts about the properties of objects 
experienced: someone who experiences something red and round must also experience something 
red, simply because the object which is red and round is also red.  
 But matters are not so simple. For on a Naive Realist form of the relational theory, 
objects have in addition many unexperienced properties, and for this reason such a theory also 
owes an account of the laws of appearance. For example, a red and round object also has invisible 
microscopic properties which are not experienced. Perceivers do not stand in the relevant 
perceptual relation to all properties of the perceived object, only those which can perceptually 
appear in experience. So the same question arises: why do some experienced properties of the 
experienced object hang together in experience and some do not? 
 By contrast, a Sense-Datum theorist holds that the objects of experience have exactly the 
properties they are experienced as having. It might seem that this theory does avoid the many 
properties problem, as we have formulated it. But in fact the problem trails not far behind. Ask 
yourself: which properties do the objects of sensing have? The obvious answer is: only those 
which are experienced as hanging together. The Sense-Datum theory, like the other theories, 
presupposes the laws of appearance — the facts about how experienced properties hang together. 
 If this is right, then all the leading metaphysical theories of perception encounter the 
challenge that lies within the many property problem: in order to describe experience correctly, 
they all have to appeal to facts about how experienced properties are connected, and then find 
space in their theories to accommodate those facts. The classical Adverbialist approach is to 
appeal to brute metaphysical facts about ways experiences are modified; the Intentionalist has to 
restrict the entailment relations between contents in a way that captures only the relations 
between experienced properties; the Naive Realist has to rule out relations to the unexperienced 
properties of ordinary objects; and the Sense-Data theory constructs experienced objects with 
precisely those properties which are related in the way they are experienced.  
 6
 All these theories of perception take for granted facts about the ways in which 
experienced properties hang together; and all of them propose more-or-less ad hoc explanations 
of these facts. Looked at in this way, the many property problem will not, on its own, decide 
between philosophical theories of perception. Rather, it is something that exposes a quite general 
characteristic of these theories: their reliance on the laws of appearance. 
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